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Abstract
This paper assesses the parameters and utility of “targeted killing” in
combating terrorism and its role within the norm of state self-defense in
the international community. The author’s thesis is that, while targeted
killing provides states with a method of combating terrorism, and while it
is “effective” on a number of levels, it is inherently limited and not a
panacea. The adoption and execution of such a program brings with it,
among other potential pitfalls, political repercussions. Targeted killing is
defined herein as the premeditated, preemptive, and intentional killing of
an individual or individuals known or believed to represent a present
and/or future threat to the safety and security of a state through
affiliation with terrorist groups or individuals. The principal conclusions
of this paper are that targeted killing: Must be wholly differentiated from
“assassination” and related operations involving the intentional targeting
of an individual during wartime, in order to be considered properly and
rationally. Is a politically risky undertaking with potentially negative
international implications. Is the proven desire of some terrorist groups
to conduct attacks involving mass casualties against innocent civilians
that may, in the future, cause states to reconsider previous abstention
from adopting targeted killing in order to protect their populace. Can
serve to impact terrorists and terrorist groups on a strategic,operational,
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and tactical level. Has historically had both negative and
(unintentionally) positiveimpacts for terrorist groups. Oftentimes exposes
civilians to unintentional harm. The methods of investigation include a
thorough review of the available literature: books, published and
unpublished essays, interviews of 2 selected individuals (to include
academics and retired members of military and police forces), and the
author’s independent analysis.
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1Targeted Killing: Self-Defense, 
 Preemption, and the War on Terrorism
Thomas Byron Hunter, M.A., M.Litt.
Killing a man is murder unless you do it to the sound of trumpets.
—Voltaire
Summary
this paper assesses the parameters and utility of “targeted killing” in 
combating terrorism and its role within the norm of state self-defense in 
the international community. the author’s thesis is that, while targeted 
killing provides states with a method of combating terrorism, and while 
it is “effective” on a number of levels, it is inherently limited and not a 
panacea. the adoption and execution of such a program brings with it, 
among other potential pitfalls, political repercussions.
targeted killing is defined herein as the premeditated, preemptive, and 
intentional killing of an individual or individuals known or believed to 
represent a present and/or future threat to the safety and security of a 
state through affiliation with terrorist groups or individuals.
the principal conclusions of this paper are that targeted killing:
●  Must be wholly differentiated from “assassination” and related  
operations involving the intentional targeting of an individual during 
wartime, in order to be considered properly and rationally.
●  is a politically risky undertaking with potentially negative internation-
al implications.
●  is the proven desire of some terrorist groups to conduct attacks involv-
ing mass casualties against innocent civilians that may, in the future, 
cause states to reconsider previous abstention from adopting targeted 
killing in order to protect their populace.
●  can serve to impact terrorists and terrorist groups on a strategic,  
operational, and tactical level.
●  Has historically had both negative and (unintentionally) positive  
impacts for terrorist groups.
●  oftentimes exposes civilians to unintentional harm.
the methods of investigation include a thorough review of the available 
literature: books, published and unpublished essays, interviews of  
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selected individuals (to include academics and retired members of mili-
tary and police forces), and the author’s independent analysis.
Introduction
this paper examines the dynamic of “targeted killing” as it relates to 
the phenomenon of modern international terrorism and the individual 
state’s rights to self-defense.
Due to the nature of modern international terrorism, particularly in its 
suicide form, and its emergence on the world stage primarily after the 
September 11, 2001 attacks, academic focus on this type of potential 
response—targeted killing—has been limited. consequently, this paper 
endeavors to contribute an essentially new and largely unexplored insight 
into targeted killing as it pertains to the state’s right to defend its  
citizens.
given the paucity of scholarly study on targeted killing, and the natural 
reluctance of nations to acknowledge any formal policy, there is relatively 
little published literature (aside from a small number of essays appearing 
primarily in academic journals) against which to balance the findings  
and conclusions presented in this paper. the bulk of the available  
literature used as reference material herein was derived from works 
pertaining to related topics, such as assassination, conventional and 
unconven tional warfare, counterterrorism, and the norm of state self-
defense.
this paper also makes extensive use of case studies involving groups 
(e.g., HaMaS, irish republican army [ira], etc.) and cites both “covert” 
and “overt” state policy as employed over the last 30 years by nations 
such as israel and great Britain in order to better elucidate the motivat-
ing factors and the risks involved in this dynamic.
Defining and Explaining Targeted Killing
Discussions pertaining to a national-level policy of premeditated killing 
of suspected or known terrorists have been hampered historically by the 
lack of accurate and agreed on definitions of this type of policy. terms 
such as “extrajudicial killing,” “extrajudicial punishment,” “selective tar-
geting,” “assassination policy,” “named killing,” and even “long-range hot 
pursuit” have been used to describe this specific type of activity.1 While 
some of these terms may have partial merit, others serve only to confuse 
the discussion and hinder debate.
Journal of Strategic Security, Vol. 2, No. 2
https://scholarcommons.usf.edu/jss/vol2/iss2/1
DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5038/1944-0472.2.2.1
3targeted Killing: Self-Defense,  Preemption, and the War on terrorism
for the purposes of this paper, the author adopts the term “targeted 
killing” for the following reasons: first and most importantly, this type of 
offensive counterterrorism action frequently elicits emotional and subjec-
tive reactions in the public at large,2 which can result in more pejorative 
designations, effectively hindering rational and unbiased discussion of 
the topic. Second, targeted killing is not equivalent to assassination—a 
term frequently and mistakenly applied to targeted killing—and thus to 
equate the two results is a misnomer that, again, hampers the discussion.
the author defines targeted killing as the premeditated, preemptive, and 
intentional killing of an individual or individuals known or believed to 
represent a present and/or future threat to the safety and security of a 
state through affiliation with terrorist groups or individuals. the latter 
portion of this definition is of particular importance, because the unique 
nature of terrorism provides states with the specific rationale for the 
implementation of a policy of targeted killing.
targeted killings, whether conducted by israel, the united States, great 
Britain, or other nations, are more frequently the result of action un-
dertaken not by conventional military forces, but rather by specialized 
troops, such as special operations forces (Sof), police, and intelligence 
agents, as discussed in greater detail in the following text. alternately, 
some nations have turned increasingly to specialized equipment, such as 
unmanned aerial vehicles (uaV) in order to stalk their prey. these spe-
cialized troops and equipment have proven to be an essential component 
of targeted killing, due primarily to the elusive and clandestine nature of 
terrorists themselves.3
rather than operating from fixed bases, terrorists often use the base-
ments of homes, rented apartments, caves, nomadic encampments, and 
other locations from which they conduct their planning and subsequent 
attacks. Moreover, their travel is often concealed, as they do not move 
about in marked military personnel carriers, but rather in civilian ve-
hicles that are nearly impossible to distinguish. in response to the tactics, 
conventional weapons of war such as tanks and heavy bombers are all but 
useless. this type of warfare requires a combination of accurate intel-
ligence, highly trained and specialized soldiers, and oftentimes the use 
of unique and advanced tracking and detection equipment. Such is the 
nature of targeted killing.
it is for these reasons, and those cited in later sections of this paper, that 
targeted killing has become a preferred, although inherently limited, 
method of reducing the threat of terrorism—particularly that posed  
by specific individuals. While defining this action and providing its 
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basic operational methodologies are relatively simple undertakings, 
the implementation of this action by the state must also be justified at a 
governmental level, and to define and agree to such a course of action is a 
complex undertaking.
Targeted Killing versus Assassination
Before proceeding with an examination of targeted killing as a method of 
state self-defense in the war on terrorism, it is important to differentiate 
between targeted killing and assassination. this is an important distinc-
tion in the context of this discussion for two primary reasons: to clearly 
illuminate the differences between the two, and secondly, to demonstrate 
that targeted killing is not a method for expressing political or ideological 
differences, but rather a purely defensive act intended to protect the state 
and its populace.
though numerous scholars and other experts have tried, the concept and 
practice of assassination has proven a complicated concept to define.4 
Decades of research and the resultant books and papers have failed to 
result in comprehensive and shared parameters and characteristics for 
this complex concept. for purposes of this discussion, assassination is 
defined as the premeditated killing of a prominent person for political  
or ideological reasons.
assassination, as a political tool, was long considered an acceptable and  
rational action. as a method of statecraft, it dates back to the earliest  
recorded governments and includes the death of Julius caesar in March 44  
B.c. Since that time, individuals, groups, and states have participated in the 
killings of prominent persons (usually heads of state or senior govern ment 
officials) in order to further their own political or ideological goals. one  
notable government body was, in fact, based on the concept of assassi nation. 
the ismalian sect founded by Hasan ibn-al-Sabbah had, as its primary 
function, assassination. indeed, it has been long believed that we derive the 
term “assassination” in use today from the “assassins”—the Hashashi of 
this sect, though the validity of this belief is currently under debate.5,6
the practice of assassination was long used as a method of expediting 
political or ideological goals is, as mentioned, a matter of historical fact. 
What is also equally clear is that assassination, as we term it here, has not 
been used to preemptively eliminate an individual who planned, person-
ally or as part of a larger group, to asymmetrically attack a given state.7 
instead, this particular type of killing is reserved for the elimination of 
political and ideological opponents of prominence.
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Despite this background, assassination is today considered a politically 
and morally unacceptable activity, and has fallen into disuse as a tool in 
the statecraft of modern nations, though formal steps to renounce its use 
came about only in the latter half of the twentieth century.8,9 even the 
united States, which formally outlawed political assassination in 1970 
with the signing of executive order 12333, was not above employing such 
tactics, particularly during the cold War.10–12
We are able to draw a distinct line between assassination and targeted 
killing. in sum, assassination is the killing of an individual or group of 
individuals for purely political or ideological reasons. targeted killing, 
in contrast, is the killing of an individual or group of individuals without 
regard for politics or ideology, but rather exclusively for reasons of state 
self-defense.
The Norm of Self-Defense
the norm of self-defense may (in its simplest and most basic form) 
be said to be the right of a sovereign nation to defend itself from 
 internal and external aggression. Self-defense in its truest sense is, of 
course, the right of every nation, none of whom are bound to united 
 nations Security council (unSc) approval in order to exercise this 
right. in the most basic example, if a nation is invaded by a  neighbor, 
it has the right to use force to repel that invasion. it need not wait 
 until it has pleaded its case to the un and received Security council 
 approval to do so. Such a requirement would violate a basic tenet of 
 sovereignty.
this simple example is not intended to suggest that self-defense is not a 
complex issue, with many different components and arguments relating 
to its implementation. innumerable books, articles, papers, and disserta-
tions have been written describing and assessing the various conditions 
and limits of this norm.
for example, as highlighted in David rodin’s War & Self-Defense, there 
is a difference in the culpability of the aggressor and the innocence of 
the defender.13 there is also the issue of historical background, such as 
in the case of lands taken from a people by force, who then later rise up 
to reclaim it.14 the question then arises: who is the aggressor and who is 
the defender? as stated in the introduction, this paper does not seek to 
answer these broader questions of the norm of self-defense, but rather 
seeks to clarify whether targeted killing is a justified form of self-defense, 
and under which conditions it may be employed.
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in this international world in which sovereign nations endeavor to exist 
peacefully despite border disputes, fragile treaties, political differences, 
and other dynamics, self-defense sometimes becomes not a mere mat-
ter of black and white, as suggested in the initial example, but rather a 
complex, multilayered consideration. the un was formed, in part, to un-
tangle this web and to give nations a forum in which to air grievances and 
settle disputes peacefully. as history has shown, this effort has proven 
successful in some cases, less successful in others.
in the latter half of the twentieth century, and into the twenty-first 
century, it has become evident that terrorism, particularly conducted by 
non-state actors employing transnational terrorism (that is to say with-
out respect for national borders), has become commonplace. thus, the 
traditional methods of warfare and self-defense have been thrust into dis-
array and challenged to their core. States have largely responded to this 
threat on an individual level, choosing to react to the threat in their own 
particular ways, while citing their right to self-defense. in some cases, 
and increasingly so following the attacks of 9/11 and the resulting actions 
of the united States, this has meant an escalation in instances of military 
preemption—attacking before the terrorists themselves can strike.
needless to say, this proactive approach to countering terrorism has 
resulted in no small number of instances in which states have found 
themselves up against the previously solid walls of national sovereignty. 
as terrorists established safe havens in afghanistan during the 1990s, for 
example, the united States has chosen to launch missile strikes against 
bases there in an effort to kill the terrorists it believed, or knew to be, 
planning attacks against it.15 there was little political fallout from these 
attacks, as nations began to realize that the new terrorist threat, particu-
larly that posed by islamic extremists, differed greatly from the domestic 
threats historically posed by the ira in the united Kingdom, Basque 
fatherland and liberty (eta) in Spain, and the revolutionary armed 
forces of colombia (farc), who typically stayed within the geographic 
area in which they had their primary grievances.
this is not to say that states did not recognize the threats posed by terror-
ists operating regionally. for example, the best-known case of targeted 
killing, the israeli pursuit of Black September terrorists following the 
1972 Munich olympics, occurred throughout europe and the Middle east 
(see later case study for further details). thus, there is ample evidence 
that in some of these cases, states chose to operate in violation of other 
states’ sovereignty in order to conduct reprisals or to otherwise eliminate 
perceived terrorist threats.
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Self-defense and preemption, while perhaps less controversial now than 
in times past, remains a vociferous subject of international debate. and 
this debate rises to one of its most heated levels when discussing the 
practice of targeted killing. nonetheless, this practice remains at the  
forefront of the counterterrorist actions of nations such as the united 
States, israel, russia, and, until recently, great Britain. the inherent  
nature of transnational terrorism precludes much of what may have pre-
viously proven effective against conventional enemies in wars past, such 
as tanks, massed ground forces, and artillery barrages.
today, the threat hides in cities, mountains, slums, refugee camps, and 
caves—virtually anywhere it can find a safe haven from which to operate. 
therefore, these conventional tools are largely an anachronism (save the 
unique case of afghanistan). the rise of targeted killing, then, comes as 
little surprise due to its specific nature of limiting offensive action to those 
individuals and locations in which the enemy can be found and engaged.
The United Nations, Self-Defense, and Preemption
the right of a nation to take action to defend itself is spelled out in article 
51 of the united nations charter, which states:
nothing in the present charter shall impair the inherent right of 
individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against 
a Member of the united nations, until the Security council has taken 
measures necessary to maintain international peace and security. 
Measures taken by Members in the exercise of this right of self- 
defense shall be immediately reported to the Security council and 
shall not in any way affect the authority and responsibility of the 
Security council under the present charter to take at any time such 
action as it deems necessary in order to maintain or restore interna-
tional peace and security.16
Many nations have cited article 51 as a basis for their primary right to 
undertake unilateral military actions, citing the requirement of self- 
defense, with or without un approval. this has, in some cases, worked 
out well for the acting state (resulting in little or no argument in the un), 
yet in some cases, as with the israeli attack on iraq, resulted in interna-
tional condemnation.
targeted killing is, without question, a form of preemption. its goal is to 
proactively eliminate terrorists before they have a chance to inflict harm 
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on the affected state’s citizens and or homeland. However, in many cases 
of preemption, the states undertaking this action have not sought or been 
granted authority to do so under the auspices (or even with the sanction 
of) of the unSc, and thus the action may be viewed as illegal.17 for this 
reason, states taking part in a program of targeted killing against a ter-
rorist threat risk political capital and international prestige when taking 
such unilateral action.
this type of “anticipatory self-defense” has taken many forms over the 
years, such as israel’s strike against arab targets in the opening hours of 
the Six Day War in 1967.18,19 While a conventional attack (as opposed to 
asymmetric) and unrelated to terrorism, it is clear that ample evidence 
existed to convince israel that a wide scale invasion was imminent and 
that it needed to strike first in order to survive the expected conflict.20 
While undertaken without un authorization, the negative political conse-
quences of this action were few, due to the obvious nature of the pending 
threat.
israel was not so lucky in 1981, when it unilaterally bombed iraq’s osirak 
nuclear reactor complex, which it claimed was being used to create nucle-
ar weapons for use against israel. following the attack, the un Security 
council unanimously adopted a highly critical resolution, followed by 
an even more strongly worded resolution that appeared tantamount to a 
threat against israel, should it repeat its attack.21,22 thus, while israel may 
have eliminated a potential future threat, it suffered greatly for its actions 
in the court of world opinion.
So, it appears clear that the concept of self-defense, even as defined in 
article 51 is a flexible and debatable concept. as thomas frank astutely 
concludes in Recourse to Force:
When the facts and their political content are widely seen to warrant 
a pre-emptive or deterrent intervention on behalf of credibly endan-
gered citizens abroad, and if the un itself, for political reasons, is 
incapable of acting, then some use of force by a state may be accepted 
as legitimate self defense with the meaning of article 51.23
the recourse to targeted killing (in itself, preemption), then, may be 
viewed as a legitimate self-defense in the war against terrorism. as the 
threat is often transnational and asymmetric, the un is institutionally 
and materially ill equipped to deal with each terrorist threat as it arises 
and spreads. thus, nations are largely left on their own to resolve the 
problem.
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Targeted Killing and Conventional Warfare
one distinction that must be made is that between the use of targeted 
killing in conventional warfare, with its inherent restrictions as found in 
the geneva conventions, and that of asymmetric warfare. tradition and 
the unwritten military code of conduct on the battlefield, too, played a 
role in restricting the specific targeting of individuals, at least for period 
of time.
for example, the tacit prohibition of the intentional and specific killing of 
generals and other senior officers in wartime is largely a result of histori-
cal precedent in which a sort of gentlemen’s agreement existed whereby 
such activity was considered uncivilized.24 this is not to say, however, 
that such killings did not occur. During the 1700s and 1800s, sharpshoot-
ers on opposing military vessels often targeted officers in order to disrupt 
command and control and to lower enemy morale.25
there is also evidence that the presence of a particular officer in battle 
may have merited special attention from the enemy. for example, dur-
ing the battle of trafalgar in 1805, British admiral lord Horatio nelson 
was felled by a sniper’s bullet. there can be little doubt that the french 
marksman in that incident was aware that he was targeting nelson, due 
not in the least to the distinctive uniforms worn by officers on both sides 
during the battle.26
More to the point, however, is the decision by which a nation’s political 
or military leaders target a specific individual of the opposing military 
forces. the goal of such an action is, ostensibly, to remove an officer of 
such high regard that his death would constitute a significant degradation 
of enemy warfighting capability—a perfectly legal and acceptable action 
in the conduct of warfare— provided such actions are taken openly  
and not through the use of what the geneva conventions describe as 
“perfidy,” as described in the following text.
examples of a state choosing to target an individual military commander 
include (but are certainly not limited to) the failed British attempt to kill 
german field Marshal irwin rommel during the north african cam-
paign, the successful British–czech plot to kill SS obergurppenführer 
reinhard Heydrich in 1942, and, more recently, u.S. efforts to eliminate 
Saddam Hussein and his sons during the early days of operation iraqi 
freedom.27–29
a valuable case study in this context is that of the purposeful and pre-
meditated killing of Japanese admiral isoruku yamamoto during World 
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War ii. in april 1943, american code breakers intercepted a message in-
dicating that admiral yamamoto would be traveling by air between mili-
tary bases in the South Pacific. news of this movement was immediately 
sent to the highest echelons of both the military and civilian leadership, 
and a mission specifically intended to kill the admiral was approved.30  
on april 18, 1943, american fighter planes intercepted a flight of 
 Japanese military aircraft transporting yamamoto to a nearby Japanese 
base. in the ensuing engagement, yamamoto’s aircraft was shot down 
and the admiral was killed.
one could make the case that the premeditated killing of yamamoto  
and the other cases cited here constitute evidence of targeted killing.  
if we are to argue that targeted killing is the “premeditated, preemptive,  
and deliberate killing of an individual or individuals known to represent 
a clear and present threat to the safety and security of a state,” then  
perhaps such an argument might have some merit. this is not the case, 
however. if we put considerations of terrorism aside for the moment,  
it is evident that military leaders, being part of a military at war, are  
valid and legitimate targets, the killing of whom is justified under the 
laws of war.
What is important here is the manner in which the killing is attempted. 
the 1977 protocol to the geneva convention specifically forbids the use 
of “perfidy,” such as masquerading as a civilian or as a representative of 
a neutral party (such as the red cross).31 in this case, if a soldier used 
such methods in order to gain proximity to a given target, he would be in 
violation of the geneva convention and (ostensibly) prosecutable under 
international law as a war criminal.
By way of example, the plan to kill general rommel involved the use of 
commandos who, infiltrated behind enemy lines via submarine and us-
ing other methods of operational subterfuge, operated largely within the 
boundaries of the convention, to include wearing allied military uni-
forms. However, the killers of obergurppenführer Heydrich in 1942 took 
a much different approach, wearing civilian clothes and operating outside 
the parameters of accepted military conduct.32
thus, we can see that the targeting of military leaders of an opposing 
armed force while in a state of war is a legally acceptable action, and does 
not represent an example of targeted killing. But what happens when the 
leader of a given state is deemed responsible for harboring terrorists, or 
sponsors their nefarious activities?
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Self-Defense and Targeting State Leaders
as argued previously, the targeting of prominent individuals, such as 
heads of state, clearly falls under the rubric of assassination. However, 
one could would argue that when that official has direct involvement  
with and is supportive of a terrorist organization, then his protected  
status should be called into question—and becomes even more pertinent 
if that official wears the rank of a military officer. States are clearly  
responsible for making distinctions between assassination of heads of 
state and the targeted killing of terrorists, though the issue is, at best, a 
murky one.
israel, for example, consistently vacillated on its position as to the tar-
geted killing of yassir arafat. citing his ongoing guidance of and support 
for Palestinian terrorism, israeli leaders frequently named arafat as a 
legitimate target. Prior to his death, israeli Prime Minister ariel Sharon 
assured President george Bush that he would not kill arafat. this assur-
ance was reportedly later withdrawn.33 ultimately, for reasons unknown, 
israel did not undertake such an operation.
another case study of interest is that of the u.S. attack on libya in 1986. 
following the bombing of the la Belle disco in germany, the united 
States unilaterally attacked libya in retribution and to strike terrorist 
training facilities located in the country.34 accordingly, the majority of 
targets chosen were linked to known or suspected terrorist activities. 
one of the targets selected, however, included one of the five personal 
residences of libyan president Muhammar Khadafi. though the presence 
of his home was known to planners, there is no evidence to indicate that 
Khadafi himself was intentionally targeted; however, nor was there any 
effort made to remove the residence from the list.
the ensuing attack resulted in the destruction of numerous facilities 
(including the Khadafi residence in which his 18-month-old adopted 
daughter was killed), aircraft, vehicles, ships, and an estimated eighty 
soldiers.35 in the years following the raid, libyan support for terrorism 
waned and eventually disappeared. the united States and libya have 
discussed the removal of libya from the list of state sponsors of terror-
ism.36 Some scholars and authors have argued that the raid on libya 
directly influenced Khadafi to opt out of the terrorist business.37
While the factual argument could be made that the leader of a state  
might justifiably be considered a viable option for targeted killing, it  
Hunter: Targeted Killing: Self-Defense, Preemption, and the War on Terror
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2010
Journal of Strategic Security
12
is highly unlikely that any state would proceed with such an action 
without careful consideration. Such a decision might force the state to 
withstand the likely perception that it has embarked on a state-sponsored 
 assassination—and risk becoming an international pariah.
Counterterrorism and Conventional Warfare
targeted killing is not the killing of a terrorist during routine military or 
security operations, such as bombing a suspected terrorist camp simply 
to deny its use by extremists, or raiding a suspected safe house in which 
unknown terrorists may be located. targeted killing, for the purposes of 
this paper, is limited to the specific selection of an individual or indi-
viduals, who are then tracked down and intentionally killed due to their 
specific involvement in a terrorist group or action.
this is not to say that a targeted killing cannot occur as part of a larger 
operation. the scope of the targeted action need not be limited to a strike 
on a single vehicle, for example. Such was the case with u.S. air opera-
tions in afghanistan following the terrorist attacks of 9/11; a targeted 
killing (or an attempt at targeted killing) may be conducted as part of a 
coordinated offensive against a larger enemy (e.g., the taliban). Such an 
attempt took place on october 7, 2001, when u.S. warplanes bombed  
the residence of Mullah omar, leader of the taliban. While this attack  
did not succeed in eliminating its target, it does provide a clear example 
of a state incorporating targeted killing into a larger overall military 
campaign.
additionally, given the dynamic nature of counterterrorist operations, 
and even during conventional operations, there are occasions when intel-
ligence is uncovered which may lead to the location of a named, wanted 
terrorist. tactical intelligence data surfacing in a larger military engage-
ment may present important opportunities for a coordinated targeted 
killing operation. this can occur in virtually any larger military operation 
targeting terrorists, such as was often demonstrated during the u.S.  
campaign in afghanistan. it comes as no surprise, therefore that a  
targeted killing operation may, on occasion, arise as a hastily coordinated 
effort stemming from a much larger military engagement.
thus, we can see that the death of a terrorist (even a wanted and  
named terrorist) that occurs coincidentally during the course of a military 
offensive or operation cannot be termed “targeted killing.” if intelligence 
is uncovered, however, during such an action, then a targeted killing  
may be instigated and acted upon even while that offensive is underway.
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Considering Weapons of Mass Destruction
Weapons of mass destruction (WMD), pose potentially the greatest risk 
of creating massive casualties in the event of a terrorist attack. these 
weapons (to include the compounds or agents that comprise the lethal 
component of the same) are generally considered in the following four 
categories:
1. nuclear (stolen nuclear warheads, “suitcase nukes,” etc.)
2. radiological (“dirty bombs”)38
3. Biological (anthrax, botulinum toxin, plague, smallpox, etc.)39
4. chemical (biotoxins, blister agents/vesicants, nerve agents, etc.)40
any one of these four categories of weapons brings with it the possibil-
ity of a catastrophic level of casualties, depending, of course, on the wide 
variety of variables inherent in the type, method of delivery, location, and 
other critical aspects of employment. thus, potentially, targeted killing 
becomes an exponentially more important consideration when assessing 
whether a given terrorist or terrorists are, at any level, pursuing WMD for 
use in an attack. individuals who would be likely to rise to the top of the 
list as candidates for targeted killing in this regard include (in no particu-
lar order of importance):
1.  Scientists providing technical expertise in the production or construc-
tion/weaponization of WMD devices or compounds;
2. terrorists known to be actively seeking to obtain WMD;
3. terrorists known to be in possession of WMD;
4.  Sympathetic logisticians or supporters working on behalf of a terrorist 
group to procure WMD.
obligated to protect its citizens, a state must now consider the new 
threats posed by terrorists who may be, or actually are, in possession of 
WMD, in a light perhaps not previously considered by states expecting 
more conventional threats. in such cases—where a state may know or 
believe that terrorists are in possession of WMD and planning an attack 
involving these devices—the motivation and incentive to conduct a tar-
geted killing will understandably become a greater priority.
according to Walter laquer, in The New Terrorism: Fanaticism and the 
Arms of Mass Destruction, the threat posed by these weapons has her-
alded an entirely new dynamic with regard to the terrorist threat:
for the first time in history, weapons of enormous destructive power 
are both readily acquired and harder to track. in this new age, even 
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the cost of hundreds of lives may appear small in retrospect…there is 
as much fanaticism and madness as there ever was, and there are now 
very powerful weapons of mass destruction available to the terrorist.41
also to be considered in this category are the related threats posed by 
terrorists who may seek to strike at nuclear power plants or chemical 
facilities in order to release radioactive gasses or toxic clouds to cause 
mass casualties. following 9/11, numerous u.S. government agencies 
concluded that american nuclear power plants were indeed vulnerable to 
such attacks, and suggested steps to increase security.42 these concerns 
are not new, of course, but these concerns must not be excluded from any 
discussion of the terrorist threat to such facilities.43
these latter threats are included here specifically to highlight the threat 
that may be posed by a single individual or a small group of individuals 
who, while not in possession of WMD, may cause mass casualties due 
to the nature of their target. in short, terrorists need not bear WMD in 
order to represent a threat equal to the use of WMD.
it may be said, then, that states should be more inclined to consider 
offensive, pre-emptive actions in order to counter these new terrorist 
threats. to rely on previously sufficient or accepted modes of “counter-
terrorism” or “antiterrorism” may expose the state to a level of risk not 
previously understood or appreciated.44 therefore, we can see that it is 
possible that states may come to consider or even rely on targeted killing 
as an accepted form of preemption, or, in fact, realize that it may have no 
alternative than to resort to this course of action, even if such a consid-
eration was once anathema to the national consensus and consciousness 
against such a practice.
Who Conducts Targeted Killings?
Due to the fact that targeted killings are largely carried out in the utmost 
secrecy, it is difficult to ascribe any single killing to any particular indi-
vidual, unit, agency, military, or even a given nation. in some cases, such 
as attacks on Palestinian extremists in the gaza Strip, the perpetrator is 
almost exclusively israel, which is often ascribed responsibility for such 
incidents.45 But whom, then, does israel call on to carry out such actions? 
an examination of this dynamic provides insight into the delicate nature 
of targeted killing and, for that reason, is warranted here.
typically, states call on the most secretive elements of their national civil-
ian and military agencies to conduct these operations. in particular, those 
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assigned to such missions are usually drawn from intelligence, special 
operations, or other elite professions. the reasons for this are obvious: 
specialized training in reconnaissance, close quarters combat, explosives, 
communications, and clandestine or covert operations.
it is this latter skill and experience that usually provides states with the 
most valued component of a targeted killing operation: plausible deni-
ability. Plausible deniability is the specific effort of a state to conceal 
the nature and relation of the targeted killing team and its action to the 
sponsoring state. in this way a state can participate in this activity with, 
ostensibly, little risk that a discovered attack will be attributed to it, thus 
avoiding possible political repercussions on the world stage or even  
retaliation from the target’s supporters, if any.
thus, in israel, these missions are typically assigned to members of the 
Mossad (responsible for human intelligence collection, counterterrorism, 
and covert action), Shin Bet (internal security), aman (military intel-
ligence) or one of a number of highly trained police or military special 
operations units, such as the elite Sayeret Matkal.46
in the united States, a few select units carry out these types of opera-
tions. these include the central intelligence agency’s Special activities 
Staff (within the Directorate of operations), the u.S. army’s Delta  
force, and the u.S. navy’s naval Special Warfare Development group 
(also known as Seal team Six).47 other, more conventional units may 
also be called on, as needed, to conduct such operations (particularly in 
the event that these more specialized units are not within an acceptable 
striking distance of a fleeting target, though these instances are likely 
rare.
these units, which have similar counterparts in dozens of other nations, 
including russia, france, and great Britain, are specifically trained to 
operate clandestinely and covertly, including operating in civilian attire, 
using false documentation and identities. they are equally proficient in 
the use of small arms, explosives, and other requisite skills.
it is important to note the nature of these personnel, as their ability to 
operate without attribution to their sponsor state is of paramount impor-
tance in most instances of targeted killing. unless a state chooses to make 
public its participation in such actions, that state must possess these 
requisite skills in order to undertake such missions. thus, we can see that 
states without these types of operatives are limited in their abilities, and 
may not be able to make use of targeted killing without risking national 
or international exposure and the problems inherent therein.
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State Study: Israel
for decades, israel has been the world’s leading practitioner of targeted 
killing. it has consistently cited its need to defend its citizens from the  
actions of Palestinian terrorists and related threats. this policy has 
sparked no end of debate, both within israel and around the world.48 
nonetheless, it has also resulted in the only known codification of the 
prerequisites for targeted killing.
in april 2002, israeli Defense force (iDf) lawyers set forth the following 
four conditions for targeted killing:49
●  there must be well-supported information showing that the terrorist 
will plan or carry out a terrorist attack in the near future.
●  the policy can be enacted only after appeals to the Palestinian author-
ity calling for the terrorist’s arrest have been ignored.
●  attempts to arrest the suspect by use of iDf troops have failed.
●  the targeted killing is not to be carried out in retribution for events of 
the past. instead it can only be done to prevent attacks in the future 
which are liable to toll multiple casualties.
in January 2003, former israeli intelligence officials claimed that israel 
had expanded its policy of targeted killing to the discharging of such  
action in other nations, including the united States.50 this assertion was 
vehemently denied by current israeli officials, but historical evidence 
is clear on the fact that tel aviv has previously authorized such opera-
tions.51
However, codified or not, rarely does an instance of targeted killing  
conducted by the israelis go without notice or some form of public  
remonstration. the greatest recent political fallout from israel’s ongoing 
application of this practice occurred in 2004 with the killing of HaMaS 
spiritual leader Sheikh ahmed yassin.
Case Study: The Killing of HAMAS Spiritual Leader Sheikh 
Yassin
on March 22, 2004, founder and spiritual leader of the Palestinian ter-
rorist group HaMaS, 67-year-old Sheikh ahmed yassin, was killed by 
guided missiles fired from an israeli helicopter as he was pushed in his 
wheelchair from a mosque en route to his vehicle. the killing sparked 
protests in the Middle east and formal condemnation from nations such 
as Britain and france.52,53
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as the founder of HaMaS, yassin was an early participant in the plan-
ning of terrorist activities. His role in recent years however, at least in 
public perception, was that of primarily that of a spiritual rather than an 
operational leader. Because much of the world viewed his killing through 
a religious prism, israel was placed in the awkward position of justifying 
the death of an elderly, crippled man who was bound to a wheelchair and 
unable to take an active role in terrorist attacks.
the political fallout from his death was multiplied because world opinion 
felt the killing had a negative impact on the ongoing and sensitive Middle 
east peace process. it was for this reason that the world audience called 
into question his killing (though this was also due to its negative impact 
on the sensitive Middle east peace process): how could israel justify kill-
ing an elderly, wheelchair-bound civilian who was obviously not going to 
be participating in any attacks himself?
from israel’s perspective, given yassin’s continued affiliation with 
HaMaS—he often blessed those who took part in attacks against  
israelis—he clearly represented a terrorist threat and was complicit in 
their actions. nonetheless, this answer, when coupled with the wide-
spread media coverage of yassin in his wheelchair prior to the attack and 
later photos of the destroyed wheelchair generated widespread criticism 
and condemnation of israel in the world community.
in sum, the targeted killing of yassin is an example of an operation that 
was technically justifiable and well within the parameters produced by 
the israelis, but which was condemned by the international community 
and which cost tel aviv a large amount of political capital.
in february 2005, israel announced a package of concessions to the Pal-
estinians that included an end to the policy of targeted killings.54 Whether 
or not israel adheres to this decision will depend on the level of future 
Palestinian terrorist aggression. Should such attacks resume and esca-
late, it is likely that israel will opt to resume its policy of targeted killing 
as an early response.
State Study: United States
Prior to 1985, the united States preferred to remain in a reactive posture 
with regard to international terrorism. following the hijacking of the ital-
ian cruise liner achille lauro by Palestinian terrorists, and the resultant 
execution of u.S. citizen leon Klinghoffer, this posture became more 
forward leaning. according to former israeli Prime Minister Benjamin 
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netanyahu, the genesis of this more offensive approach originated, in 
part, in a series of discussions between netanyahu and then-Secretary of 
State george Shultz.55 in a 1985 speech at the Jonathan institute, Shultz 
stated:
can we as a country, can the community of free nations, stand in a 
purely defensive posture and absorb the blows dealt by terrorists?  
i think not. from a practical standpoint, a purely passive  defense 
does not provide enough of a deterrent to terrorism and the states 
that sponsor it. it is time to think long, hard, and seriously about 
more active means of defense—defense through appropriate 
 preventive or preemptive actions against terrorist groups before they 
strike.56
following the attacks of September 11, 2001, the Bush administration 
was confronted with having to respond, more aggressively than ever 
before, to the threat of international terrorism.57 Washington did not wait 
long, however, before making it clear to the world that a new era of “an-
ticipatory self-defense” had been ushered in, and that the united States 
would follow this course of action in order to kill or capture terrorists 
worldwide.58
President Bush further outlined this more aggressive, offensive approach 
to counterterrorism in a speech to the 2002 graduating class at the u.S. 
Military academy at West Point:
our security will require transforming the military you will lead—a 
military that must be ready to strike at a moment’s notice in any dark 
corner of the world. and our security will require all americans to 
be forward-looking and resolute, to be ready for preemptive action 
when necessary to defend our liberty and to defend our lives.59
Since that time, the united States has conducted innumerable global 
counterterrorist operations, both successful and unsuccessful targeted 
killings against such prominent terrorist figures as osama bin ladin and 
Mullah omar and their key lieutenants.60 So intent is the united States to 
locate these individuals that it has included many on an official “wanted” 
list, which offers multimillion dollar rewards for information leading to 
their apprehension.61
Case Study: The Killing of al-Harithi
the most public example of targeted killing by the united States against 
an individual terrorist occurred on november 3, 2002, when a Predator 
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uaV, armed with Hellfire guided missiles, was used to attack a vehicle 
in which the terrorist was traveling.62 the resulting explosion killed all 
in the vehicle, including the suspected target, abu ali al-Harithi, an al 
Qaeda leader and one of the terrorist network’s top figures in yemen.
officials in the united States still refused to admit responsibility for 
the attack, though a significant amount of reporting indicates that the 
central intelligence agency (cia) operated the drone. the day follow-
ing the attack, u.S. Secretary of Defense Donald rumsfeld was asked if 
the united States had been involved in the explosion. He did not identify 
those responsible for the attack, though he did seem well aware of the 
target.
the following exchange is insightful and is provided as an example of 
the plausible deniability with which the united States and other nations 
often approach public questions about incidents of targeted killing.63
Q: Mr. Secretary, what can you tell us about the car explosion that 
was reported today in yemen? Were any u.S. forces involved in that? 
and have you learned anything about the aftermath of who was killed 
in that event?
rumsfeld: i’ve seen the reports. and the discussion in one of the 
reports—i didn’t notice whose report it was, but it looked like a wire 
service report of something out of the region—it said that Harithi 
might be involved, in which case, as i recall, he was in fact one of the 
people that is thought to have been involved with the uSS cole.
Q: Have you confirmed that through government sources?
rumsfeld: no. i have not. and needless to say, he has been an indi-
vidual that has been sought after as an al Qaeda member, as well as a 
suspected terrorist connected to the uSS cole.64 So it would be a very 
good thing if he were out of business.
it is clear that targeted killing has become an accepted american foreign 
policy option, with a tacit rationale in self-defense. While this undoubt-
edly will result in questions about its legality and, perhaps more import-
antly, the volatile issue of the u.S. military conduct of operations abroad, 
there is little question that this practice will continue.
the policy of targeted killing, as adopted by the united States, has also 
caused consternation among legal observers who feel that this method of 
premeditated killing crosses the boundary set forth in executive order 
12,333, which bans assassinations. However, it is clear that the united 
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States justifies this approach as part of its “global war on terror,” and thus 
applies the rules of war. Simply put, it argues that terrorists are not civil-
ians, and are in fact enemy combatants, and are thus legitimate targets.
this assessment can be supported when considering that, as both terror-
ism and counterterrorism are forms of asymmetric—not conventional—
warfare, it is difficult to ascribe the same methodologies and judgments 
that might have been present in World War ii. for example, no longer is 
the enemy wearing distinct uniforms, carrying their weapons openly, or 
even obeying the spirit of the geneva convention.
additionally, given that the “battlefield” is undefined and that a terror-
ist attack can occur anywhere, the armed interdiction of a terrorist must 
sometimes necessarily occur in locations and at times not necessarily 
preferred or chosen by the authorities. that targeted killings occur is, in 
some cases, an act of necessity in order to prevent an imminent attack. 
While this argument will be addressed in full later on in the text, it is suf-
ficient here to note that the united States, like other nations, must neces-
sarily reserve its right to self-defense, particularly against an asymmetric 
threat such as terrorism.
State Study: Great Britain
great Britain’s long history of involvement in northern ireland brought 
with it innumerable challenges in attempting to combat the terrorist 
threat. these challenges resulted in many changes to British law as it per-
tains to terrorism, as well as the adaptation of the security and military 
forces to combat it on the ground. the inclusion of great Britain in this 
discussion also serves to highlight the difficulties inherent in justifying 
targeted killing. Specifically, it clearly presents the challenges present 
even in the face of what appears to be overwhelming evidence that a tar-
geted killing was undertaken to stop terrorist actions immediately prior 
to and, in fact, during their execution.
the loughall case, which we will examine here, also highlights numerous 
ancillary aspects of targeted killing, namely, the question of an unspo-
ken policy (allegedly in place during the 1970s and 1980s) of “ambush-
ing” ira terrorists rather than attempting to effect their arrest, the 
hazards of targeted killing and collateral damage, and the potential for 
political backlash in the event of a questionable (or legally challenged) 
 interdiction.
in an effort to provide improved tactical guidance to its military forces in 
northern ireland, the British government mandated the distribution of 
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the “yellow card.” the yellow card was, quite literally that: a laminated 
card to be carried at all times by British military personnel. on the card 
were the official guidelines for the use of force by British soldiers.
among the general rules were (selected rules provided verbatim):65
●  never use more force than the minimum necessary to enable you to 
carry out your duties.
●  if you have to challenge a person who is acting suspiciously you must 
do so in a firm, distinct, voice saying “Halt—HanDS uP.”
●  if the person does not halt at once, you are to challenge again saying 
“Halt—HanDS uP” and, if the person does not halt on your second 
challenge, you are to cock your weapon, apply the safety catch, and 
shout, “StanD Still i aM reaDy to fire.”
of course, the soldier could not simply engage any individual he wished, 
yellow card or not. He had to have reasonable cause, such as the percep-
tion of a legitimate threat to himself or his fellow soldiers.
Mark urban offers in his book Big Boys Rules that as the term “ambush” 
was often used by officers briefing their men prior to a counterterrorist 
operation, and that the yellow card was thus often disregarded, such is 
evidenced in this interview between urban and an SaS member:66
urBan: What is the mission on an ambush?
SaS Man: you know what the mission is on an ambush, everybody 
knows what the mission is on an ambush.
urBan: tell me what you think it is.
SaS Man: i know that when you do an ambush you kill people.
Case study: Loughall, Northern Ireland
in May 1987, British intelligence units began monitoring several well-
known and active ira terrorists who were planning an attack against a 
royal ulster constabulary (ruc) station in loughall, northern ireland.67 
in anticipation, both the SaS and police surveillance experts worked out 
a coordinated effort to monitor the terrorists for days prior to the expect-
ed attack. authorities also staked out the location where the explosives 
to be used in the attack were located, a farmhouse located just kilometers 
from the ruc station.
on the day of the planned bombing, the two terrorists were joined by six 
other group members who approached the station in a van and a stolen 
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tractor, to which had been affixed a massive 200-pound explosive device. 
the terrorists planned to drive the tractor into the ruc compound and 
detonate the device, thus leveling the station. after the attack, they would 
steal any weapons in the station, then beat a hasty retreat.68
at least fifty armed military and police personnel (including additional 
SaS personnel flown into northern ireland specifically for this action) 
had taken up hidden positions around the area in order to interdict the 
terrorists. in an interesting twist, the SaS also posted men inside the 
station, despite the assessment that the station itself was the target. the 
mission briefing described the operation as a “massive ambush.”69
unaware of the presence of the authorities and the impending ambush, 
the terrorists arrived, alighted their vehicle, and opened fire on the 
station. at the same time, the tractor was driven up to the gate of the 
compound, where the terrorists lit the fuse to detonate the device, which 
exploded and partially destroyed the station. as they opened fire, how-
ever, the combined SaS/police force reacted, firing an estimate 1200 
rounds at the gunmen.70 all ira personnel were killed in the ensuing gun 
battle, as was one civilian, who happened to be driving through the area 
at the time of the ambush.
While it may be argued that this incident was a clear case of self-defense, 
the european High court in 1991 ruled against the united Kingdom, cit-
ing violations of the human rights of the eight dead terrorists.71 While the 
court did not rule the shootings illegal, they did determine that the ensu-
ing investigation conducted by the British government was in violation 
due to what the court deemed “faulty effectiveness of investigation into 
shooting.”72 this result demonstrates, again, the political risks states run 
in conducting what may be a justifiable case of targeted killing.
additionally, it appears that there can be no argument that the force sent 
to interdict the terrorists in this case was intentionally placed in that 
position not to arrest them, but rather to kill them. Had the authorities 
wished to simply arrest the eight men, this could have been accomplished 
in the days preceding the attack.73 thus, despite denials by the British 
military and legal challenges brought to the european High court, the 
loughall incident appears to be a textbook case of targeted killing.
When Is Targeted Killing Justified?
While this paper avoids ascribing moral or ethical judgments to this 
discussion of targeted killing, it is of value to examine the circumstances 
Journal of Strategic Security, Vol. 2, No. 2
https://scholarcommons.usf.edu/jss/vol2/iss2/1
DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5038/1944-0472.2.2.1
23
targeted Killing: Self-Defense,  Preemption, and the War on terrorism
in which states can legitimately claim that the use of targeted killing is 
within the norm of self-defense. in any offensive lethal action, there exist 
any number of opportunities for accidents and abuse. as mentioned  
earlier, there are no universally accepted laws governing the use of tar-
geted killing. each nation is responsible for applying its own domestic  
laws and concepts of self-defense when considering this option. in the 
absence of actual laws, therefore, it may be beneficial to examine a 
hypo thetical scenario in which targeted killing might be justified as self-
defense.
for example, if a terrorist were observed packing a vehicle with explo-
sives, wiring the explosives to a handheld detonator, then driving that 
vehicle toward a crowd of soldiers or a crowded marketplace (or a police 
station, in the case of the loughall incident described earlier), it seems 
reasonable to assume that eliminating that terrorist would be justified.  
in this case, it would appear that there could be little argument against 
the idea that a terrorist who is in the process of carrying out a terror-
ist attack is a legitimate subject for targeted killing.74 the duty of a state 
to protect its citizens from this threat is clear and unassailable, and the 
terrorist’s death (assuming for the sake of argument that he could not be 
captured alive) is a necessary outcome.
this example of a terrorist in action is the exception to the rule, of course. 
Many times, targeted killings take place far from the scene of an attack, 
both in time and place. for example, in the case of the u.S. targeted kill-
ing of al-Harithi, his detection and interdiction took place two years and 
hundreds of miles away from the act for which the united States held him 
accountable: the attack on the uSS cole. in this case, the united States 
cited al-Harithi’s ongoing and active membership in al Qaeda as the basis 
for his killing.
So, we can see that the dynamics of international terrorism severely test 
the one truly effective countermeasure that is able to combat it: targeted 
killing. Just as there is no universally accepted definition of the term, 
there is equally no universally accepted norm under which its use is 
permitted, even in what might seem the most direct cases of state self-
defense.
as mentioned previously, killings conducted for political reasons rather 
than for direct security concerns are not targeted killings, but rather 
assassinations. for example, as cited in the case of israel’s elimination 
of Sheikh ahmed yassin, there are individuals whose elimination may 
serve both purposes. the death of yassin both eliminated a high-ranking 
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politico-religious figure, and it may also have had a negative effect on 
HaMaS’s ability to wage its terrorist campaign.
However, within the world of terrorism and insurgency, it is often diffi-
cult to differentiate between those participating in terrorism directly, and 
those providing political, moral, or spiritual leadership. Very often, these 
are intertwined. in these instances, nations can be expected to mold and 
modify their explanations for a given killing to fit the circumstances (par-
ticularly to avoid either a domestic or international political backlash). 
for example, russia’s killing of senior chechen military leaders may, 
on one hand, be justified in that they are indeed in command of troops 
in the field. on the other hand, they are also serving in senior political 
positions. this dual responsibility often provides the aggressor state with 
justification for eliminating political leaders under the pretext of elimi-
nating a terrorist threat.
Targeted Killing at the Strategic, Operational, and 
Tactical Levels
it is difficult to determine at what stages and with what results targeted 
killing may be considered to have “worked.” the value placed on the suc-
cess of such a mission is wholly dependent on the expected outcome. Do 
the aggressors intend, with such a killing, to bring about the collapse of 
a given group? or, are the goals less grand, simply with the intention of 
preventing a specific attack?
the answer may be more internalized, rooted in the motivations and 
methodologies of the terrorist group itself. Does the group seek death as 
part of its operational repertoire, or even as the means to an end, such 
as in the case of martyrdom? or, does it endeavor to keep its operatives 
alive, so as to fight another day? there are three areas which must be 
considered here in order to fully answer this question: strategic, opera-
tional, and tactical. these issues are critical when determining whether a 
targeted killing can even possibly be considered successful.
Strategic
in answering the first series of questions, the preponderance of informa-
tion leads to the conclusion that the targeted killing of senior leaders 
or individuals does not lead to the dissolution or usually even a severe 
degradation of that group’s capabilities or intentions. this is particularly 
true in the case of those groups with long, established histories and large 
or highly motivated memberships, or a wide support base (e.g., al Qaeda, 
the revolutionary armed forces of colombia [farc], or Spain’s eta). 
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these include terrorist groups, for example, that are seeking national 
identity.75 Smaller groups, such as the red army faction and the red 
Brigades survived the killing and imprisonment of key leaders and  
continued operations for years.
to borrow a conclusion from senior ranD terrorism analyst Brian  
Jenkins in his commentary in Newsday (December 3, 2003):
the more an enterprise draws from deep roots or has a broad base, 
the less the effect of the death of its leader. it is not the loss of a 
single leader that fells a movement, but the elimination of its leader-
ship, operational capabilities, constituency and conditions.76
additionally, the elimination (particularly the violent termination) of a 
leader, who has gained a “mythic” status among his supporters, can serve 
to demoralize a terrorist movement. as this mythic quality can often 
serve as a force multiplier in a terrorist campaign, the elimination of this 
element can have a strong impact. this is particularly true if the leader 
has previously identified himself (or is perceived by followers) to be im-
mune to capture or death at the hands of the enemy.
yet, these considerations do not wholly limit the potential effectiveness 
or applicability of targeted killing. it is likely that, less established, newly 
founded groups may be more susceptible to such actions. this is an im-
portant consideration when states are confronted, for example, with the 
phenomenon of splinter groups—smaller, usually more violent offshoots 
of larger, more established (and oftentimes more politically reasonable) 
terrorist groups. as such, splinter groups are inherently (as least in their 
nascent stages) not as well supported as their parent body. they are more 
vulnerable to eradication through the arrest or the killing of their ostensi-
bly more radical leaders.
this is to say that such groups are ostensibly less well financed, less 
well supported, and more reliant on an individual or a small group for 
their moral guidance and operational viability. thus, this critical node 
of the splinter group is a key element (likely the essential element) in its 
existence, the removal of which would likely result in its deformation and 
eventually dissipation.
another, possibly more important aspect of the debate surrounding 
targeted killing is that it may serve as a viable tool in strategic efforts to 
reduce terrorism. the difference here lies not in the target selection, per 
se, but rather in the motivations and beliefs of the targeted group itself. 
Within those terrorist groups whose goal is not martyrdom, but rather 
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survival (e.g., ira volunteers), the effects of targeted killing are much  
different. While islamic extremist terrorists may seek death as a way 
to enter a desirable religious afterlife, and thus are not deterred by the 
deaths of comrades by whatever means, this is not the case with many 
secular groups, or groups that do not share a given belief system.
thus, while targeted killing may not prove a disincentive to those former 
groups, the reality is much different among groups who seek to survive 
their attacks and “live to fight another day.” this difference may also 
complicate the efforts of those groups seeking to survive and flourish in 
the long run. for example, according to one former British SaS veteran 
with 20 years’ experience in northern ireland and in other conflicts, the 
killing of group members, particularly leaders, had a decisively negative 
impact on future recruiting efforts.77 it is also possible that such elements 
that may be present among secular terrorists, such as the quite under-
standable fear of being killed, may also prove a strong disincentive in the 
face of a (either overt or covert) targeted killing campaign.
Operational
in an operational sense, the selective elimination of key personnel, 
particularly those with critical skills (i.e., bomb makers, logisticians, 
recruiters, financiers), is likely to have a detrimental effect on the short 
to mid-term operations of any terrorist group. certainly, the larger the 
group, the less the impact, due to the probability of a group being able to 
replace that individual—or to shift another, equally qualified individual 
into the role of the displaced member.
additionally, and particularly in the case of islamic extremism, the 
sheer volume of potential recruits greatly reduces the overall operational 
impact of targeted killing. as the daily occurrence of suicide bombings in 
nations around the world proves, despite the number of terrorists killed 
in such attacks, the supply of candidates for the next day’s attacks ap-
pears limitless. this, too, affects not only the operational perspectives on 
targeted killing, but that of its strategic questions as well. in an environ-
ment in which the targets are ostensibly perpetual, can targeted killing 
truly have an impact to a significant enough level to justify its risks?
it may be argued that, when faced with a seemingly constant influx of 
suicide volunteers, states must nonetheless act to interdict these indi-
viduals when and where they appear, to both interrupt the flow of new 
recruits and to (ostensibly) preclude future attacks. the idea of inaction 
against such a known threat is unthinkable in a modern state. thus, 
while targeted killing has only a limited impact on some terrorist groups, 
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it is a necessary and logical tool for use in preventing future attacks. 
Much like the multitude of hapless soldiers who swarmed up out of the 
trenches into the face of machine gun fire in World War i, the enemy had 
to be engaged, lest they overrun friendly forces and gain territory.
in fact, while this assessment is partly based on the author’s analysis, it 
may be that targeted killing serves as an operational deterrent to terror-
ism. With the practice, at least as conducted by the united States and 
israel, well known to civilians and terrorists alike, it is possible and even 
likely that this knowledge may force terrorists to operate in a more clan-
destine mode, thus hindering their operational capabilities, perhaps even 
reducing the number of attacks.
in some cases, even the threat of targeted killing may be sufficient to 
produce a positive result (i.e., the release of hostages). one example of 
this occurred in June 1985, when Shiite terrorists hijacked a tWa flight 
en route from athens to rome. the plane was then diverted to Beirut, 
lebanon. there, the terrorists tortured several passengers, eventually 
executing one u.S. navy diver and tossing his body onto the tarmac, in 
plain sight of international news crews.
in the days that followed, the terrorists removed the hostages from the 
plane and dispersed them throughout Beirut, in an effort to complicate 
any possible armed rescue attempt.
according to an account by former israeli Prime Minister Benjamin 
netanyahu in Fighting Terrorism, the office of the u.S. Secretary of State 
asked his advice as to how they should proceed. netanyahu responded: 
“ ‘issue a counter-threat,’ i told him. ‘Make it clear to the terrorists that if 
they so much as touch a hair on any of the hostages’ heads, you won’t rest 
until every last one of them has been hunted down and wiped out.’ ”78
the Secretary’s office later reported back to netanyahu that they had 
acted on his advice and the results had been positive. a few weeks later, 
all the hostages were released unharmed. While this release was due, in 
part, to a previously negotiated settlement unrelated to the hijacking and 
subsequent kidnapping, it is possible that the counter-threat of targeted 
killing achieved its desired result.
another, slightly different, example of this potential by-product of tar-
geted killing occurred in December 1975 when two ira terrorists, quite 
literally on the run from authorities, barged into an occupied apartment 
and took two civilian hostages. the incident ended on the sixth day when 
authorities announced that an SaS team had arrived on scene and was 
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prepared to storm the apartment.79 in this case, the perceived threat to 
their lives presented by the presence of the SaS was enough to cause the 
terrorists to surrender.
it is important to note—there is no evidence to indicate that the inten-
tions of the SaS team at the scene were in any way related to a prede-
termined course of targeted killing. it must be noted, however, that the 
reputation of the SaS as feared, ruthless killers was widely believed 
throughout the united Kingdom, and particularly in northern ireland. 
this mythology would play itself out over the next decade, when the SaS 
killed at least 28 ira members in various confrontations.80
Despite these potential and actual benefits, it must be noted that at-
tempting to reduce a group’s operational capabilities through targeted 
killing is of limited utility when posed against groups practicing advanced 
security measures. in Inside Al Qaeda, author rohan gunaratna identi-
fies one crucial aspect:
to ensure al Qaeda’s operational effectiveness, the group stresses the 
need to maintain internal security, dividing its operatives into overt 
and covert members functioning under a single leader…al Qaeda’s 
global network has survived by its members strictly adhering to the 
principles of operational security.81
the continued “success” of al Qaeda (measured in its ability to conduct 
major terrorist attacks worldwide despite international efforts to eradi-
cate it) is a testament to its members’ adherence to operational security. 
More importantly, for purposes of this discussion, this ongoing viability 
is evidence of the ineffectiveness of targeted killing (as practiced by the 
u.S. in this case) in providing a significant detriment to the group’s op-
erational capabilities.82
Tactical
targeted killing may be said to “work” in its most obvious sense when 
it directly results in the thwarting of an imminent terrorist attack; the 
surveillance and interdiction of known, armed terrorists en route to an 
airport, or driving a truck laden with explosives toward a city centre, 
or even a lone, armed terrorist entering a subway system. all of these 
would likely be considered justifiable killings, and would most certainly 
be examples (if successfully interdicted) of the effective use of targeted 
killing. in this, its most elemental form, is found its most immediate and 
appropriate function.
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one example is the SaS killing of three ira terrorists in gibraltar in 
1988. While this case is an ongoing matter of debate as to whether the 
SaS soldiers involved intended to kill the ira terrorists, this provides a 
concrete example of the efficacy of surveilling and intentionally engaging 
named terrorists known to be planning an imminent attack.
in early 1988, three known ira terrorists traveled to gibraltar with the 
purpose of planting a large explosive device in a car to target British 
soldiers during a changing of the guard ceremony at the governor’s resi-
dence.83 the SaS team was warned that the device might be detonated 
by a remote control in the hands of one of the terrorists. to prevent this, 
British and Spanish intelligence services cooperated in their efforts to 
surveil the trio as they traveled from ireland to gibraltar.
on the afternoon of March 6, a small SaS team confronted the three and, 
in the ensuing melee, shot all three dead. the resultant investigation 
(mandatory in cases of the military’s use of lethal force outside a combat 
zone) revealed that the ira members were all armed, though there was 
no bomb in the car (the device was later located in a neighboring town), 
and the killings were declared legal following a military tribunal. no 
bystanders and none of the SaS personnel were injured.
clearly, the actions of the SaS in this case thwarted an imminent attack 
that almost certainly would have killed and injured numerous British  
soldiers and visiting tourists. this case, if in fact the order was given to 
kill the individuals, served to prevent an atrocity that would otherwise 
have taken place. thus, in this sense, we have strong indicators that 
targeted killing can indeed serve as a lawful and proactive measure in 
combating terrorism.
on the tactical level, targeted killing has its most obvious application: 
stopping a terrorist before he has the opportunity to conduct an immi-
nent attack. a sovereign state has the duty to act to protect its citizenry, 
and in cases where a clear and present danger exists, such as in the case 
of an imminent terrorist attack, targeted killing becomes a more viable 
option than perhaps in the preceding two categories.
When Does Targeted Killing “Fail”
as we have seen, targeted killing can have a beneficial impact on several 
levels for those states waging counterterrorist campaigns. However, it 
is equally important to analyze the numerous ways in which a policy of 
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targeted killing can backfire and create a host of unforeseen problems 
for states that engage in this type of action. among the most important 
potential weaknesses of targeted killing are the possibilities of collateral 
damage, creating martyrs, the failure to exploit potential terrorist re-
sources through capture rather than killing, and the possibility of nega-
tive international political repercussions.
Collateral Damage
one issue to be considered is clearly that of “collateral damage”—more 
specifically, the potential for loss of life among innocent bystanders at the 
scene of an attack. While the killing of an innocent person directly (such 
as the Mossad’s failed operation in lillehammer) is indeed quite rare, the 
nature of terrorists, operating not from fixed bases but rather in virtually 
any environment, increases the likelihood of civilian exposure.84 the  
potential risk is posed to those who may happen to be walking by a boo-
by-trapped vehicle, sitting in an outdoor café next to a wanted  terrorist, 
or merely sauntering down a city street as a missile attack is launched 
from a nearby helicopter.
Some notable recent examples include the following:
Date target Method result
May 30, 
2004
Wael nassar, head 
of izzedine al 
Qassam, Hamas’ 
military wing
airstrike,  
israeli air force
target and  
bodyguard killed; 
one civilian killed85
March 22, 
2004
Sheikh ahmed 
yassin
airstrike,  
israeli air force
target killed; six 
bystanders killed, 
numerous  
injured86
June 10, 
2003
abdel aziz rantisi, 
leader of gaza-
based HaMaS unit
airstrike,  
israeli air force
target escaped; six 
civilians killed87
July 23, 
2002
Salah al-Shahada, 
Hamas military 
leader
airstrike,  
israeli air force
target killed; 14 
civilians killed, 140 
injured88
october 7, 
2001
Mullah omar,  
taliban leader 
airstrike, u.S. 
air force 
target absent; two 
civilians killed89
november 
9, 2000
Hussein abayat, 
fatah member 
airstrike,  
israeli air force
target killed; two 
civilians killed90
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there are innumerable other examples like these, though usually involv-
ing lower-ranking terrorists. the fallout from collateral damage contin-
ues to plague targeted killing operations and draws greater attention to 
the potential for innocent loss of life. for example, on July 15, 2005, the 
israeli air force launched a missile attack against a van as it transited a 
street in gaza city, killing four HaMaS terrorists, including the body-
guard of a high-ranking group member.91 the van contained a cache of 
homemade rockets and explosives, which subsequently detonated,  
sending shards of fragmentation hundreds of yards in all directions.92  
no bystanders were reported killed or injured, but given the nature of the 
cargo and the location of the van on a city street, the potential for such 
casualties was obvious.
the potential risk of injuring or killing bystanders, then, is clear due in 
no small measure to the elusive nature of the target and the terrorist’s 
proclivity for operating in urban areas or locations otherwise crowded 
with civilians. unless the preoperational intelligence is fully accurate and 
can verify that there are no explosives or other potentially lethal items in 
the possession of the terrorist, there can be no way to predict the out-
come of a violent encounter. even in the absence of the use of a vehicle, 
the chaotic results of a missile strike or a booby-trapped car bomb cannot 
be accurately and definitively predicted. in these and other scenarios, 
civilians are often inadvertently placed in harm’s way due to the dynamic 
nature of hunting down and killing terrorists, whatever their location.
The Martyrdom Effect
another potential downside to targeted killing is what, for the purposes 
of this discussion, is termed the “martyrdom effect.” this well-known 
dynamic occurs when a terrorist, particularly one held in high esteem by 
group members and followers, is killed at the hands of security forces. 
this can result in the perceptual uplifting of that terrorist to near mythic 
status, thus inspiring followers to avenge the killing, and thereby fos-
tering an ongoing cycle of violence. While the subject of martyrdom is 
sufficiently vast to fill tomes, it is beyond the scope of this paper to fully 
address this phenomenon. its impact on targeted killing, however, neces-
sitates a cursory discussion here.
as detailed earlier, even if the killing does not result in retributive  
attacks, it can also serve to increase (not decrease) the morale of a given 
group. Such events are frequently witnessed following the death of a 
senior group member and the ensuing mass funeral marches common 
throughout the Middle east. Billboards throughout the gaza Strip and 
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elsewhere, for example, extol the sacrifice and bravery of suicide bombers 
and other terrorists who have met violent ends.
Such is the nature of terrorism today, particularly islamic extremist 
terrorism, whereby martyrdom has become not just a by-product of a 
terrorist act, but per se a primary motivation for that act in itself.93 this 
phenomenon is unlike the irish hunger strikers of the 1970s or any of 
the deaths of secular terrorists in action where martyrdom was not the 
primary motivation for individual involvement in an action resulting in 
death. Such was the case with the ira’s Bobby Sands (a hunger striker 
whose death caused a major outpouring of sympathy and support within 
the northern ireland republican community and elsewhere). in some 
cases these deaths did indeed result in their elevation to what may only 
be described as martyr status.
thus, we can see that there is an important difference between the “mar-
tyrdom” of a secular terrorist (which arises primarily from respect and 
acknowledgment of sacrifice for a given action) and that of a religious 
terrorist (whose martyrdom is accepted as the final reward of his actions 
from a higher power). that difference is that the secular terrorist desires 
to live beyond the attack cycle, while the religious terrorist seeks and 
expects his death as part of the attack itself.
Killing versus Capture
another factor that must be considered is that of the choice made by 
states to kill rather than capture a known terrorist. in the short term, 
particularly in instances of an expected imminent attack, targeted kill-
ing may be unavoidable to prevent the loss of innocent life. However, in 
those cases in which a terrorist or terrorists are monitored for long  
periods of time and do not appear to be involved in a near-term attack, 
their killing may not only be unnecessary but might also eliminate a  
potentially valuable source of intelligence.
a good example of this was the arrest of senior al Qaeda planner  
Khalid Sheikh Mohammad (aka KSM) in March 2003 by Pakistani police 
officers. it is clear from the evidence that these forces could easily have 
killed KSM, had they chosen to do so. instead, recognizing the potentially 
vast amount of intelligence they could gather from him regarding previ-
ous and future planning for terrorist attacks, they opted to arrest rather 
than kill him. the resulting interrogations revealed valuable insight into 
al Qaeda and their global network and operations.94
information gleaned from the interrogation of captured terrorists can 
result in the capture or killing of higher-ranking group leaders, the  
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disruption of attack planning, interdiction of lines of communication, 
and a host of other related benefits.95 therefore, while the targeted kill-
ing of a terrorist may seem the most expedient course of action in some 
cases, it is clear that the termination of a person who may hold valuable 
information (potentially far out of proportion to his own value within an 
organization) could prove counterproductive when considering the pros-
ecution of a long-term counterterrorist campaign.
Political Repercussions
the last element considered in this section is the potential for nega-
tive political repercussions. While states commonly reserve the right 
to self-defense, the unique nature of terrorism (namely, the likelihood 
that wanted terrorists may flee beyond the borders of the state) can 
 sometimes mandate that states consider conducting operations out-
side their own sovereign territory. Due to the potential for overwhelm-
ing political fallout, not to mention the possibility of inciting a wider 
conflict with a neighbor, it is rare that a state will risk authorizing such 
 operations.
following israel’s killing of Sheikh yassin, france, germany, and the 
united Kingdom vociferously condemned the attack.96 of the major 
world powers, only the united States refused to condemn the attack, 
citing yassin’s involvement with terrorism and israel’s “right to self-
defense.”97 Prominent non-governmental organizations, such as amnesty 
international, also condemned the attack, stating that, “once again israel 
has chosen to violate international law instead of using alternative lawful 
means” and that “the assassination of Sheikh yassin is likely to further 
escalate the spiral of violence.”98
to further compound israel’s public “black eye,” the algerian govern-
ment on March 23, one day after the attack, sponsored a draft resolution 
in the unSc condemning israel for its actions. eleven members of the 
unSc voted in favor, three abstained, though the united States ultimate-
ly quashed the resolution by exercising its veto powers.99,100 this did not 
preclude un Secretary general Kofi annan from publicly condemning 
the attack: “Such actions are not only contrary to international law, but 
they do not do anything to help the search for a peaceful solution.”101
clearly, such overt targeted killings do not go unnoticed on the world 
stage. States must be willing to risk the most severe forms of internation-
al condemnation (e.g., un resolutions, the possible risk of treaty pull-
outs, economic sanctions) should they choose to pursue targeted killing 
as a tool in their counterterrorism arsenals.
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Case Study: The 1972 Munich Olympics and the Israeli  
Response
Perhaps the most notable example of a targeted killing campaign  
that resulted in negative international repercussions was conducted by 
israel following the 1972 Munich olympics. this case study provides  
an exam ple of the potentially disastrous consequences when states  
partake in unilateral actions (particularly prolonged actions) against  
perceived or known individual terrorist threats. While a detailed  
examination of the Black September operation and the complex events 
surrounding it are beyond the scope of this paper, the relevance of  
this particular event merits special attention here, and for that reason, 
will be discussed in greater detail than in the previously outlined case 
studies.
in September 1972, a team of eight heavily armed terrorists from the pro-
Palestinian group Black September attacked an apartment block hous-
ing israeli athletes in Munich, germany.102 in the resulting action, the 
terrorists killed two athletes outright, and took nine hostages. Protracted 
negotiations ensued, involving representatives from numerous countries, 
including egypt, germany, and israel. During this time, the entire event 
was televised worldwide to an audience of hundreds of millions—thus 
granting the terrorists the audience they so greatly desired.
these negotiations resulted in an agreement by which the terrorists 
would be granted safe passage out of germany. However, upon arrival 
at the airport, german police opened fire. in the ensuing gun battle, all 
israeli hostages, five of the eight terrorists, and one german policeman 
were killed. three of the terrorists were taken into custody, though soon 
released, when Palestinian terrorists hijacked a lufthansa flight and 
demanded their safe return of their imprisoned comrades.103
in the aftermath of the attack, senior israeli officials (including Prime 
Minister golda Meir) decided to form a covert action team to track down 
and kill those individuals who participated and planned the operation. 
the team was given permission to operate worldwide in its efforts to 
fulfill its mission. the operatives were selected from both the military 
special forces and intelligence (Mossad) communities and hand picked 
for their ability to operate covertly and their willingness to undertake 
missions resulting in the targeted killing of their prey. among these were 
personnel from the elite Sayeret Matkal counterterrorism unit, equiva-
lent in the West to great Britain’s SaS and russia’s Spetznaz (“spetsial-
noye nazranie,” or “special purpose troops”).
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it is indeed rare for a state to sanction official targeted killing teams with 
a global mission. it is rarer still for this sanction to come from the high-
est level of a state government.104 Such was the sentiment in israel at the 
time, the public bursting with outrage over the atrocity, that Meir recog-
nized that the actions of Black September could not go unanswered. “We 
will smite them wherever they may be,” she stated in an address to the 
Knesset soon after the attack.105
in the months that followed, the israeli team hunted down and killed 
numerous members of Black September around the world, in lebanon, 
italy, and france. it was in norway, however, that the israeli operation 
unraveled. in the mistaken belief that it had tracked down one of its most 
wanted terrorists, ali Hassan Salameh, a small team of Mossad operators 
gunned down an individual on a public street in lillehammer, norway. 
the dead man turned out not to be Salameh, but rather ahmed Bouchiki, 
a Moroccan waiter who was returning from a cinema with his pregnant 
wife. Simon reeve, in One Day in September, describes the shooting and 
the events that followed as “one of the greatest disasters in the history of 
the Mossad.”106
norwegian authorities soon arrested many of the team who had par-
ticipated in the incident, some of whom were later sentenced to prison 
terms. their confessions led to arrests in france, a public trial in norway, 
and worse for the leadership in tel aviv, exposure of israel’s blatant dis-
regard for national borders and outrage at conducting an illegal targeted 
killing on foreign soil.
in the end, the retaliatory missions launched by israel did eventually  
result in the deaths of most Black September terrorists involved in the 
Munich massacre; the killings were conducted in secrecy and with  
plausible deniability to distance israel from the actions. However, the 
lillehammer disaster not only exposed israel’s secret intelligence  
network to public scrutiny, but more importantly prompted deteri o ra-
tion in its international prestige, leading to significant political  
fallout.
Conclusions
targeted killing has always been and will remain a double-edged sword. 
While states may need or choose to eliminate known or perceived threats 
posed by individuals, the risks, as stated previously, can be immense. 
there are a number of important conclusions we can draw from the  
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arguments and case studies cited in this paper. first, the practice of  
targeted killing will continue into the foreseeable future, with states  
prepared to risk political capital and collateral damage in order to  
enforce their perceptions of self-defense. Second, this practice will 
remain controversial in the legal battlefields of the un, the Hague, and 
in other centers of international legal order and debate. it remains for 
each individual state to decide if the risks of targeted killing are worth the 
rewards.
on a more practical level, however, it appears that targeted killing, as 
a tool of counterterrorism, is a weapon of only limited strategic utility. 
there is little evidence to indicate that the killing of a specific individual, 
no matter how high ranking, will have a lasting impact on that group’s 
ability and willingness to continue to wage a terrorist campaign. this  
is particularly true for those groups with widely shared ideologies and  
characteristics, long operational histories, and a wide member and 
 support bases. conversely, it must be stated, targeted killing may be 
more effective when employed against smaller groups or those less well 
established and more reliant on a single leader or leaders for their  
ongoing operations.
targeted killing does, on the other hand, offer states a method of dealing 
tactical and operational blows against terrorist targets. this is particu-
larly true in the case of interdicting terrorists known to be preparing or 
undertaking an imminent terrorist attack. additionally, the elimination 
of terrorists who contribute specific and hard-to-replace skills may also 
impact groups in the short to medium term.
at best, the results of state campaigns of targeted killing have been 
mixed. in some cases, it is certain that the elimination of individuals  
has prevented pending and future attacks. in other cases, this tool  
appears to have been used in a preventative sense—eliminating individu-
als involved with terrorism (e.g., the SaS ambush at loughall), but with 
no evidence to indicate that they represent a clear and present threat 
(Sheik yassin).
clearly, terrorism presents states with security challenges that differ 
greatly from those posed by conventional warfare. States have been 
forced to adapt to these challenges. this has involved the modification of 
existing laws, the creation of new laws, the development and deployment 
of specialized military and security units, as well as new technologies 
designed to assist these forces. equally as controversial as some of these 
Journal of Strategic Security, Vol. 2, No. 2
https://scholarcommons.usf.edu/jss/vol2/iss2/1
DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5038/1944-0472.2.2.1
37
targeted Killing: Self-Defense,  Preemption, and the War on terrorism
adaptations has been the adoption of contentious and politically risky 
policies that hinge on the already debatable concepts of anticipatory self-
defense and preemption.
as we have seen, the majority of states have not chosen to appeal to the 
un for justification in defending themselves from terrorism (at least not 
on a case by case basis, and certainly not in terms of seeking permission) 
in those cases in which targeted killing was applied. States have, instead, 
chosen to allow vague guidelines, such as citing article 51, to justify their 
offensive counterterrorist campaigns. this vagueness permits states to 
operate in a grey world in which they are able to cross national boundar-
ies, both in terms of sovereign borders and international agreements. in 
the final analysis, it is interesting to note that israel, the most prolific and 
experienced practitioner of targeted killing, is the only state known to 
have made an official effort to set out the conditions in which its military 
may conduct such operations.107
However, as already noted, the ongoing terrorist quest for methods  
of attack that will cause mass casualties may alter the landscape on  
which we have to date viewed targeted killing. So to many, the fear of  
terrorists flying a jetliner into a nuclear power plant or chemical farm 
causes justifiable concern. as the potential risk of massive loss of life at 
the hands of even one terrorist becomes more realistic, it is likely that 
states will adopt more flexible approaches to self-defense. targeted kill-
ing, still considered an internationally debatable method of preemptive 
action, may become less of an ill-thought of arm of counterterrorism, 
and more valued as a potentially efficient and effective method of self-
defense.
inevitably, states will still have to consider the immeasurable and innu-
merable possible consequences of embarking on even a single targeted 
killing operation due to the reasons cited earlier, namely the potential  
for collateral damage, martyrdom, and political fallout. it is this debate—
the risk versus the reward—that states will have to consider as they seek 
new and potentially controversial methods to defend themselves from  
the specter of terrorism or opt to continue their agenda of targeted  
killing.
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Appendix A
Selected international incidents of targeted Killing: 1973–2004
Date
Primary 
target(s) Method location
Perpe-
trator108 result
april 17, 
2004
abd al-aziz 
al-rantisi, 
successor to 
Sheikh yassin
iaf apache 
helicopter 
using guided 
missiles
gaza city israel109 target 
killed
March 22, 
2004
Sheikh ahmed 
yassin, 
HaMaS spiri-
tual leader
iaf apache 
helicopter 
using guided 
missiles
gaza city israel110 target 
killed, 
seven  
others 
killed, 
more  
than 20 
injured
february 
13, 2004
Zelimkhan 
yanderbiyev, 
former chech-
en president
Booby-
trapped car
Qatar russia111 target 
killed, 
along with 
two body-
guards
november 
3, 2002
Qaed Senyan 
al-Harithi, al 
Qaeda senior 
operative
u.S. Preda-
tor drone, 
equipped 
with guided 
missiles
yemen united 
States112
target 
killed, 
along with 
five pas-
sengers
March 19, 
2002
chechen war-
lord omar ibn 
al-Khattab
letter  
impregnated 
with uniden-
tified poison
chechnya russia,  
via 
federal 
Security 
Service 
(fSB)113
target 
killed
october 18, 
2001
atef abayat, 
senior mem-
ber of al-aqsa 
Martyrs’ Bri-
gade
Booby-
trapped car
israel, 
near Beth-
lehem
israel114 target 
killed, 
along with 
two pas-
sengers
april 21, 
1996
chechen war-
lord Dzohkar 
Dudayev
guided  
missile115
chechnya russia116 target 
killed
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Date
Primary 
target(s) Method location
Perpe-
trator108 result
March 7, 
1988
three  
members of 
the ira
Small arms gibraltar, 
uK
uK, via 
Special 
air 
Service 
(SaS)117
all three 
targets 
killed
May 8, 
1987
eight  
members of 
the ira
Small arms loughall, 
northern 
ireland
uK, via 
Special 
air 
Service 
(SaS)118
all eight 
targets 
killed
april 10, 
1973
yusuf al-
najjar, head of 
fatah intelli-
gence arm; 
clandestine 
commando 
operations
Beirut, 
lebanon
israel119 all targets 
killed
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